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UK governance: from overloading to freeloading 
Richard Woodward 
 
The UK’s ongoing political turbulence has prompted a reprise of debates from 
the 1970s when many concluded the country was ungovernable. Then the most 
influential diagnosis conceptualised the UK’s governance problem as one of 
‘overloading’ caused by the electorate’s excessive expectations. This article 
argues that these accounts overlooked another phenomena besieging UK 
governance during this period. This phenomena was freeloading, the withering 
of government capacity deriving from the ability of actors to enjoy the benefits of 
citizenship without altogether contributing to the cost. In the interim these 
problems have become endemic, not least because of the unspoken but 
discernible policy of successive governments to turn the UK into a tax haven. 
High profile scandals involving prominent individuals and corporations plus the 
failure to clampdown on them have reinforced the perception that the UK’s 
political system is geared towards the rich and the powerful at the expense of the 








The referendum result in favour of exiting the European Union (EU) and the 
inconclusive outcome of the 2017 General Election are the latest manifestations of a 
crisis of UK governance. Countless culprits have been implicated in the Brexit whodunit 
nevertheless the profound and widespread disaffection of many UK citizens with 
politics, politicians and political institutions is a chief suspect. The provenance of this 
alienation is contested but is frequently traced to the failure of the UK’s political 
machinery to deliver on promises or to meet the electorate’s expectations. In the last 
decade examples of this failure have been legion: the failure to deliver robust, balanced 
or inclusive economic growth, the failure to eliminate the budget deficit, the failure to 
meet homebuilding targets, the failure to control immigration, the failure to remedy the 
tribulations plaguing the National Health Service, the failure to address chronic 
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underinvestment in infrastructure, and the failure to adequately equip, prepare and 
protect services personnel in and for combat zones.   
 This has prompted a reprise of the debates from the 1970s when an equivalent 
epoch of anaemic economic expansion, public policy failure, and mounting cynicism 
about politics led many to conclude the UK was ungovernable.1 Training their 
stethoscopes on the heart of the UK body politic the country’s political scientists 
broached various diagnoses, the most influential of which deemed the patient to be 
displaying symptoms of overload.  
The overload thesis held that faith in the UK’s political institutions was being 
eroded by a perennially expanding gulf between the electorate’s expectations of 
government and the government’s capacity to fulfil them.2 Adherents to the overload 
thesis apportioned the bulk of the blame for the expectations gap to excessive voter 
demands. This article argues that in downplaying the issue of government capacity these 
accounts overlooked the onset of another phenomenon besieging UK governance in the 
1970s. This phenomenon was freeloading, the withering of government capacity deriving 
from the ability of actors to enjoy many of the benefits of citizenship without altogether 
contributing to the cost. This dilemma has been aggravated in the interim by the 
acceleration of the unstated but discernable policy of successive administrations to 
transform the UK into a tax haven. As a tax haven, the UK permits rich individuals and 
corporations to profit handsomely from the public goods paid for out of general taxation 
whilst simultaneously supplying them with subterfuges that allow them to curtail their 
UK tax liabilities. Irrespective of citizen demands, tax avoidance and evasion deprives the 
UK government of the revenue necessary to discharge its responsibilities. By worsening 
inequality tax avoidance and evasion have also damaged the UK’s democratic 
institutions. Many citizens perceive that the UK’s political institutions and processes are 
geared towards the interests of a wealthy elite but are unsympathetic to the preferences 
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of the majority. The seriousness of this predicament was finally acknowledged in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis whereupon a crackdown on tax avoidance was 
pledged as part of the strategy to taper the UK’s yawning budget deficit. Like previous 
endeavours however, the strength of the clampdown has been sapped by the hardwiring 
into the policymaking process of the interests favouring the perpetuation of Britain’s tax 
haven status. 
 
The 1970s – overloading and freeloading 
 
In the decades after the Second World War, the orbit of UK government 
obligations bloomed as a consequence of interventions intended to promote social 
justice by mitigating the excesses of capitalism. Unfortunately this coincided with the 
growing intractability of problems not least, anticipating later debates about globalisation, 
because intensifying international interdependence put the scale and complexity of issues 
beyond the compass of individual governments. By the 1970s, these divergent tendencies 
had left a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the electorate’s expectations and the 
government’s propensity to deliver them.  
Despite reflecting on the UK government’s deteriorating capacity the overload 
thesis concluded that the foremost quandary was a self-reinforcing escalation in the 
demands on government. The broadening of UK government responsibilities 
engendered new constituencies with vested interests in expanding the state’s largesse. 
Rather than risk a backlash at the ballot box governments opted to appease these 
sectional demands with extra resources. The effects of this were most pronounced in the 
economic sphere where higher public expenditure outstripped tax revenues eventually 
precipitating a fiscal crisis that left the UK at the mercy of the International Monetary 
Fund.   
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Most advocates of the overload thesis asserted that to quell voter demands state 
responsibilities should be devolved to private and market actors. This thinking chimed 
with the incipient New Right who believed the post-war settlement had fostered a 
dependency culture. They supposed that rolling back the frontiers of the state would 
break the cycle of dependency by placing greater onus on individuals and corporations to 
satisfy their demands in the market place. In practice, the policies of liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation championed by the New Right, and that have been the 
hallmark of UK policymaking since, augmented rather than attenuated the problems of 
overload.  
First, these policies inspired new demands of the UK government. The UK’s 
exposure to market forces stimulated petitions for state intervention from those 
contending with the consequences, not least a clamour of corporate constituents who 
implored governments to safeguard the UK’s reputation as an attractive place to do 
business and to grant dispensations that gave UK industries a competitive edge in global 
markets. It was likewise recognised that the durability of freer markets was critically 
dependent on a strong state to devise and enforce a framework of rules to regulate the 
competitive forces that had been uncorked. Second, these policies have heightened the 
complexity of UK governance, further weakening government control of the country’s 
destiny. For example, during the last four decades the pursuit of economic objectives has 
regularly been derailed by a mercurial global economy, the intransigence of major 
economic partners or the necessity of complying with the welter of international rules 
and treaties by which the UK was bound.  
The self-defeating nature of these remedies reflected the overload thesis’ partial 
diagnosis. The excessive spending spawned by electoral demands unequivocably 
contributed to the UK’s fiscal plight in the 1970s. Nevertheless this posture distracts 
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from another aspect of these fiscal imbalances, namely the mounting difficulties of 
raising sufficient tax revenue.  
Tax revenues are an essential component of the social contract whereby citizens 
forgo a portion of their income in return for the state supplying the physical, human and 
legal infrastructure needed to fortify freedom and the market economy. After 1945, the 
state’s ability to underwrite this contract was bolstered by an international economic 
order predicated on ensuring finance was subject to national structures of democratic 
governance. Under the supervision of the Bretton Woods system of economic 
management, strict controls were maintained on short-term capital movements. These 
restrictions stifled attempts to move money overseas to shelter it from the privations of 
the tax inspector. By the 1970s however, the UK had acquiesced in developments that 
had emaciated these controls releasing an army of fiscal termites that were gnawing away 
at the ship of state’s revenue raising power.  
Beginning in the late 1950s, the UK played a pivotal role in the crippling of 
capital controls and the growth and consolidation of tax havens and the wider offshore 
world. Most famously in 1957 the Bank of England tacitly sanctioned the premise that 
business executed by UK banks on behalf of non-resident counterparties in foreign 
currencies were not subject to UK regulation. This stimulated the development of the 
Euromarkets, markets in currencies mediated outside and beyond the regulatory control 
of their territory of issue, which provided a conduit for money to circumvent exchange 
controls. Concurrently elements within the UK government were agitating for the 
creation of tax havens amongst their network of Crown Dependencies and Overseas 
Territories. The leading protagonists were the Bank of England, who viewed these 
centres as a way of buoying the fortunes of British banks and funnelling money to the 
City of London, and the Ministry of Overseas Development, who saw financial services 
as a way of securing the economic wellbeing of the UK’s island outposts.  
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Although the definition is disputed, tax havens are generally regarded as 
jurisdictions that specialise in financial transactions for foreigners whom they seduce 
through indulgent fiscal, regulatory and legal frameworks. Detailed expositions of the 
services offered by tax havens and their allure are available elsewhere3 but their primary 
attraction lies in reducing or eradicating their client’s obligations in their native 
jurisdiction. For individuals, the paramount advantage of tax havens is secrecy. The UK 
tax system operates on a residence principle under which UK residents are liable for tax 
on their worldwide income. Tax havens uphold stringent privacy laws that prohibit, in 
most circumstances, financial institutions from sharing information about customers 
with domestic and international tax authorities. Likewise they offer opaque financial 
structures that camouflage the beneficiaries of assets. Unless money located in a tax 
haven is declared it is highly improbable that tax officials will detect it. For multinational 
corporations (MNCs) the main advantage of tax havens lies in decoupling the substance 
of economic activity from the place it is recorded for tax purposes. By their very nature 
MNCs possess affiliates and entities in multiple jurisdictions. For tax purposes each 
affiliate is treated as a separate entity. The combination of capital mobility and the 
convenience of tax havens made it easier for MNCs to establish artificial entities 
undertaking transactions orchestrated to make it appear as though their profits are 
generated in the more permissive tax environment.  
Unsurprisingly individuals and companies rushed to exploit these newfound 
opportunities. By the late 1960s, Jersey’s banking sector had attracted deposits worth 
almost £300m with the City’s banks using these offshore satellites as booking centres to 
obtain more sympathetic tax treatment for their Euromarket transactions.  This period 
also marked the embryonic phase in the development of an organised tax planning 
industry devoted to conceiving and commercially marketing schemes to utilise tax 
loopholes. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Inland Revenue became increasingly 
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exasperated about dwindling revenues ensuing from UK residents and companies using 
offshore ruses to circumvent taxes.4 Indeed in his evidence to the House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee in 1975, the Inland Revenue’s Chairman, Sir Norman Price, 
went as far as to describe tax avoidance as ‘a national habit’5. In short, UK governance 
was not simply encountering overloading from steepling demand it was simultaneously 
confronting freeloading by those whose wealth and business empires thrived upon the 
privileges and protections provided out of the public purse yet which could, through the 
use of tax havens, relinquish a substantial part of their duty to pay for them. 
 
Tax haven UK 
 
Forty years on the fondness for freeloading amongst famous figures and firms 
has forced the topic to the forefront of debates about UK governance. Hardly a week 
now passes without some fresh revelation of tax avoidance committed by a prominent 
corporation or celebrity. Amazon, Barclays, Boots, Caffe Nero, Facebook, Google, Ikea, 
Starbucks, and Vodafone are amongst dozens of firms that have attracted censure for 
paying minimal UK corporation tax despite sustaining extensive business activity in the 
country. Meanwhile leading stars including Jimmy Carr, Michael Caine, Gary Barlow, 
George Michael, Bradley Wiggins, and Chris Moyles are known to have capitalised on 
schemes contrived to diminish their tax liabilities. Stories embroiling eminent individuals 
or paragons of the high street understandably hog the headlines but are just the tip of the 
iceberg. Jimmy Carr, for instance, was just one of 1100 people using the Jersey-based K2 
tax scheme that put annual earnings of £168m beyond the clutches of what was now Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Moreover, these arrangements are typical of 
thousands of others. In 2012, the National Audit Office found that HMRC was probing 
41000 tax avoidance schemes marketed to small businesses and individuals. It is also 
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illuminating that HMRC has the tax affairs of approximately two-thirds of the UK’s 800 
largest companies under investigation at any given time. Far from a fringe activity 
undertaken by a handful of maverick accountants or corporate treasurers tax avoidance is 
rife. 
Before turning to the governance issues arising from freeloading it is worth 
pausing to consider why it has intensified. Paradoxically conditions conducive to tax 
avoidance and evasion are principally the result of the brands of policies touted to deal 
with overload. For example, galvanised by an ideological predisposition to promote 
individual liberty the Thatcher administration extinguished capital controls. Inevitably 
rich individuals and corporations used this newfound freedom to siphon money and 
profits into tax havens. Equally the statutes governing the taxation of financial 
instruments and transactions were rendered anachronistic by the wave of innovations, 
such as derivatives and securitisation, which flourished following the deregulation of the 
City. Furthermore, as the salutary tale of Public Finance Initiative (PFI) told below 
testifies, offshore has become an intrinsic ingredient of the strategies deployed to span 
the gap between tax receipts and public spending commitments.      
Simultaneously the tax policymaking process was permeated by the tax planning 
industry. Conventional wisdom about UK tax avoidance and evasion portrays the 
problem as a game of cat and mouse in which the cunning tax-abusing rodents routinely 
outwit the hapless feline revenue inspectors. In reality rather than being the passive 
victim of provisions to shrink tax liabilities the state has, through its connivance with the 
tax planning industry, been their primary architect.6 The Treasury’s creation in 2010 of a 
liaison committee populated exclusively by executives from multinational enterprises to 
‘provide strategic oversight of the development of corporate tax policy’ was typical of the 
revolving door between Whitehall’s mandarins and the tax planners. As Richard Brooks’ 
evidence supplied to the Treasury Select Committee in 2011 noted, the result is that 
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swathes of the corporate tax code are being written by ‘policy-makers…..in conjunction 
with the very vested interests that stand to gain the most from their decisions’. 
Corporations and their armadas of tax planners no longer had to concoct elaborate 
schemes to minimise taxes, the state was designing the schemes for them. Put another 
way the cats were sabotaging their own mousetraps. 
This sabotage has been abetted by the vitiation of HMRC. Since 2005 the 
number of HMRC staff has plunged from 105,000 to 58,000 and its budget from £4.4bn 
to £3.2bn. The purging of the organisation has denuded it of expertise, especially in units 
dealing with High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) and large corporations, leaving it 
prostrate before those whose tax affairs it is supposed to oversee. Powerless to properly 
police the tax rules HMRC has increasingly resorted to offering ‘sweetheart deals’ with 
terms highly favourable to tax avoiders. In January 2016, following a six year 
investigation, Google reached a settlement with HMRC to pay £130m in back taxes. The 
government’s jubilation over the deal stood in stark contrast to the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee, which observed ‘the sum paid by Google seems 
disproportionately small when compared with the size of Google’s business in the UK’.7 
Even including this supplementary payment Google is reported to have paid just £200m 
in UK corporation tax since 2005 on estimated UK profits of £7.2bn, an effective rate of 
2.77%. The absence of a penalty and the fact that Google has license to perpetuate its tax 
structure will only embolden potential emulators.         
The wholesale privatisation of the tax policymaking process and the emasculation 
of enforcement in the name of what the Treasury euphemistically refers to as an 
‘internationally competitive tax environment’ has legitimised freeloading and has serious 
repercussions for UK governance. The most obvious manifestation of freeloading are 
shortfalls in tax revenues, which undermines the government’s ability to undertake the 
tasks upon which its legitimacy depends. Its clandestine character and the absence of 
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agreed classifications make quantifying the fiscal leakages from tax avoidance and 
evasion difficult and controversial. HMRC reckoned that in 2014-15 tax evasion (of all 
hues not just that involving offshore structures) amounted to £5.2bn and tax avoidance 
£2.2bn. These calculations however rest on preposterously narrow definitions. They 
exclude the kinds of profit shifting machinations exemplified by Google and which are 
commonplace amongst the tax strategies of large multinational enterprises. Likewise, 
myriad individual avoidance packages are discounted by virtue of the debilitated HMRC’s 
propensity to identify them. Most commentators submit that the true scale of tax 
avoidance and evasion in the UK is considerably higher. One analysis determined that 
tax avoidance by US corporations alone costs the UK roughly as much as the figure 
printed by HMRC while another declared that UK individuals have assets worth 
US284bn (£170bn) stashed offshore denying the exchequer another $8bn (£5bn) per 
annum.8 Irrespective of the precise amount, the essential point is that rampant 
freeloading is ultimately incompatible with the government’s commitment to the proper 
funding of public goods.     
Incongruously some of the most notorious perpetrators of tax avoidance are also 
amongst the most prodigious consumers of public goods and recipients of government 
gratuity. The most egregious examples come from the banking sector. As the taxpayer 
was writing a blank cheque to bail out the financial system it was revealed that the big 
four high street banks were operating a network of 1,649 tax haven subsidiaries. Nearly 
700 of these entities belonged to the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Lloyds Banking 
Group, institutions in which the taxpayer had invested £65bn and was now the biggest 
shareholder. Similarly governments continue to award procurement contracts to scores 
of pharmaceutical, information technology, healthcare, utility and infrastructure 
companies that maintain tax haven companies as a core component of their corporate 
structure.  
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To alleviate the strain on the nation’s finances, governments struck upon the idea 
of funding public goods with private capital through PFI. In this way schools, hospitals, 
roads and other infrastructure could be constructed without hurting the government’s 
fiscal position. Sadly PFI has provided rich pickings for those determined to plunder the 
public coffers. Most PFI companies borrow the money to endow their projects. Despite 
the risks being mitigated by government backed income streams and wheezes that 
virtually guarantee the project’s profitability, PFI companies are curiously inept at 
borrowing cheaply. Conveniently their exorbitant borrowing costs yield tax-deductible 
interest expenses that eradicate years of tax liabilities. The PFI companies then recoup 
their investment through charging fees to the end users. Invariably these payments are 
routed to tax haven hosted companies. The absurdity plumbed new depths when it was 
divulged that in 2001 the then Inland Revenue had signed a PFI deal surrendering the 
‘ownership and management’ of its 600 building estate to a Bermudan based company 
with the result that today’s HMRC cannot tax its landlord’s capital gains.  
 
Freeloading, inequality and democracy  
 
Defenders of the status quo point out that corporations and rich individuals 
make sizable contributions to the UK exchequer. In 2015-16, 27.5% of the UK’s income 
tax revenues were paid by the top 1% of earners whilst PwC’s ‘100 group’ of large 
companies ponied up 13.3% (£82.3bn) of government tax receipts.9 That this is the case 
when, as the Google episode demonstrated, HNWI’s and corporations are able to 
structure their financial affairs in a way that results in them paying tax at a fraction of the 
headline rate bears witness to the stratospheric levels of inequality in the contemporary 
UK. These inequalities, which freeloading has magnified, are feeding a sense of injustice 
that is poisoning the UK’s democratic institutions.     
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Despite four decades of subservience to free-market nostrums the UK’s tax take 
as a percentage of GDP has scarcely altered.  To counteract the revenues haemorrhaged 
by a regime that countenances widespread tax abuse by the richest groups in British 
society, UK governments have opted to raise indirect taxes (such as value added tax and 
alcohol, tobacco and fuel duties). The Office for National Statistics notes that ‘indirect 
taxes in the UK have been regressive throughout the period’ since 1977.10 What currently 
has the moniker of austerity is simply the compounding of a forty year long programme 
to square the freeloading circle by moderating spending and levying taxes that 
disproportionately distress the poorer segments of society. During this time, the UK 
went from being one of the most equal OECD countries to one of the most unequal.11 
To quote the Association of Revenue and Customs, the union representing senior 
HMRC staff, ‘the country cannot afford this madness. The Government is acting like an 
unhinged Robin Hood – taking from the poor and giving to the rich’12.  
Soaring inequality has brought into sharp relief the well-documented tension 
between the egalitarian tendencies of democracy and the wealth (and hence power) 
concentrating propensities of capitalism. Assisted by the Bretton Woods settlement, the 
UK’s post-war governments were able to legitimise capitalism and stabilise democracy 
through widely shared increases in real incomes. Conversely the subsequent economic 
polarization has bred a perception that the UK’s democracy is mutating into a plutocracy 
where a self-serving elite receives special treatment and wields outsize influence on the 
political system at the expense of the marginalised majority.  
The UK’s ‘non-domiciled’ residents are illustrative in this regard. ‘Non-doms’ are 
UK residents whose permanent home or domicile is elsewhere. They are spared tax on 
foreign income unless it is remitted to the UK. Theoretically non-doms cannot enjoy the 
proceeds of their foreign wealth in the UK without handing over their pound of flesh to 
the exchequer. In practice there are untold loopholes, not least that after being resident 
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for seven years non-doms can, instead of paying tax on a remittance basis, pay an annual 
charge of £30,000 (rising to £90,000 for those who have been UK resident for at least 17 
of the last 20 years). Predictably the UK is home to a veritable international jet-set of 
oligarchs, shipping magnates, corporate executives, hedge fund managers and sports stars 
who are delighted to discover they can enjoy their millions in exchange for a payment 
miniscule in comparison to prevailing income tax rates. Most of the UK’s 115,000 non-
doms are not intimately connected with politics. Amongst their ranks however are press 
barons and major donors to political parties. During the 2015 General Election campaign 
it was divulged that non-doms had donated over £27m to the three main political parties 
since the turn of the century.  
 Whether non-doms exert a disproportionate political influence is an open 
question. Nonetheless, the prominence of non-doms and other freeloading donors 
imperil the UK’s democratic integrity by imparting ‘an ingrained sense that the political 
process is rigged in favour of the rich, the powerful and the well-connected’.13 
Revelations that David Cameron had earned £31,500 from selling shares in a 
Panamanian based trust established by his late father served only to entrench this 
impression. Democratic governance requires that everyone has the opportunity for an 
equal say in collective decision making. This does not mean that everyone has equal sway 
but the outcome ought to reflect the most persuasive argument around which people 
could be mobilised rather than who has the most resources to set the political agenda. 
The standing of the UK’s governing institutions has been damaged in the eyes of many 
citizens by their inkling that they are insensitive to the inclinations of the majority and 
that outcomes are systematically slanted in favour of individuals and groups who, by 
virtue of their wealth, dominate the political process.  
 Since the financial crisis every UK government has given assurances that it will 
take action to subdue tax avoidance and evasion. As well as providing a lucrative source 
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of revenue to staunch the bloodletting on the public balance sheet such clampdowns 
would also respond to resentment fuelled by stories juxtaposing the apparent ease with 
which corporate behemoths could sidestep their taxes with the spending cuts and tax 
rises inflicted on the preponderance of citizens. In fact post-crises governments were 
perfecting the Janus-faced attitude to freeloading inherited from their predecessors, 
publicly denouncing tax abuses whilst unobtrusively advertising and extending the UK’s 
tax haven credentials. For instance in the 2011 Budget, which George Osborne claimed, 
was ‘doing more to clamp down on tax avoidance than any in recent years’ the 
government announced changes to the Controlled Foreign Corporation rules that 
renounced the exchequer’s right to tax profits repatriated from the foreign subsidiaries of 
UK headquartered enterprises. The upshot was that companies could keep their tax-
deductible costs at home but had huge incentives to funnel their profits via a tax haven 
subsidiary. The introduction in 2013 of a General Anti Abuse Rule (GAAR) to strike 
down tax practices that, whilst legal, undermine the intention of the tax laws plus a 
public register of UK companies’ beneficial owners to make it more difficult for 
proprietors to hide their identity behind the anonymous ‘shell’ companies offered by 
many tax havens, likewise suggested a tough line. Regrettably the beneficial ownership 
registry is riddled with escape clauses and exclusions and before HMRC can pursue 
enquiries via the GAAR it must first seek approval from a panel composed mainly of 
businesspeople. To date no cases against big business have commenced. Even if they 
were it is doubtful whether the HMRC, whose staff numbers may fall as low as 41,000 by 
2020, would have the resources to prosecute them. 
 At the international level Cameron’s coalition government used its G8 Presidency 
to foment support for OECD standards to promote the automatic exchange of 
information between tax authorities and its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
project designed to counteract aggressive tax planning by multinational enterprises. The 
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coalition and the Conservative majority government also signed up to various EU 
ventures on corporate tax transparency culminating in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package 
of 2016. The UK government has nonetheless been a ‘difficult friend’14 of the OECD 
and EU processes, frustrating breakthroughs on key issues and even instigating policies 
that run contrary to the aims of the initiatives. This policy schizophrenia has continued 
under the May governments. The Prime Minister has repeatedly highlighted the civic 
virtue of paying taxes and averred her determination to tackle tax avoidance and evasion. 
Yet in a speech in January 2017 May made a veiled threat that if the EU failed to offer 
satisfactory Brexit terms the UK would redouble its tax haven strategy in order to remain 
competitive. Overall the supposed suppression of tax avoidance and evasion in the post-
crisis period has been little more than a façade behind which freeloaders can perpetuate 




The UK’s is suffering its worst crisis of governance since the 1970s. Just as in the 
1970s, lacklustre economic growth, the failure to reflect citizen preferences, and 
ostensible impotence in the face of external developments are battering the legitimacy of 
the UK’s political institutions. Whilst the conventional wisdom ascribes the governance 
crises of the 1970s and the present to overload this article has suggested that freeloading 
is also a common denominator. The ability of HNWIs and multinational corporations to 
legally avoid and illegally evade taxes while voraciously consuming the public goods for 
which those tax revenues pay has blown gaping holes in the UK’s public finances. The 
economic inequality fostered by freeloading has also tarnished the democratic credentials 
of the UK’s political institutions. Citizens feel disenfranchised by institutions that they 
judge, rightly or otherwise, are only responding to and lavishing exceptional treatment 
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upon a wealthy minority. Alone serious and sustained action to quash freeloading is no 
panacea to the multifaceted challenges facing UK governance but it may at least 
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